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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient key establish-
ment scheme designed with respect to the unique require-
ments of Wireless Mesh Networks. Our security model is
based on Identity-based key establishment scheme without
the utilization of a trusted authority for private key opera-
tions. Rather, this task is performed by a collaboration of
users; a threshold number of users come together in a coali-
tion so that they generate the private key. We performed
simulative performance evaluation in order to show the effect
of both the network size and the threshold value. Results
show a tradeoff between resiliency and efficiency: increas-
ing the threshold value or the number of mesh nodes also
increases the resiliency but negatively effects the efficiency.
For threshold values smaller than 8 and for number of mesh
nodes in between 40 and 100, at least 90% of the mesh nodes
can compute their private keys within at most 70 seconds.
On the other hand, at threshold value 8, an increase in the
number of mesh nodes from 40 to 100 results in 25% increase
in the rate of successful private key generations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.1 [Computer Communica-
tion Networks]: Network Architecture and Design—Wire-
less communication; E.3 [Data Encryption]: [Public key
cryptosystems]
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Mesh Metworks (WMNs) are wireless networks
in which the nodes are able to carry out mesh routing by
utilizing multi hop communication. They are dynamically
self-organized, self-healed and self-configured; meaning that
the mesh nodes form a network on the fly. Furthermore,
they offer both low-cost and high-speed network services for
the end users. Along with the ease of their deployment,
they provide mobility, flexibility, robustness and increased
coverage with an effective level of scalability. To have those
advantages, utilization of WMNs is preferred in the areas
that do not have wired infrastructure or are in terrain of
difficult deployment.
WMNs are enclosed with mesh routers and mesh clients,
where the infrastructure, given in Figure 1, shows a coopera-
tion in wireless communication carried out among a number
of mesh nodes [17]. The difference between these two types
of mesh nodes is not only in their mobility, being the mesh
routers stationary while the mesh clients either stationary
or mobile, but also in the energy consumption constraints
they have. Mesh clients are known to be more limited in
energy consumption. Therefore, the load of functionalities
that require high computational power and bandwidth can
be burdened on the mesh routers. Additionally, at any time,
any node can either join or leave the network without affect-
ing network functionality.
Figure 1: Infrastructure of a WMN
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Nevermore, multi hop communication and the nature of
wireless channel make WMNs prone to both passive and
active attacks. In a WMN, a passive attack will result
in violation of confidentiality whereas an active attack will
compromise resiliency, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation [17]. Thus, communication security between
the mesh nodes is an important research area. In order to
maintain mutual trust and secure communication among the
mesh nodes, a key establishment service must be provided.
Considering the network being dynamically self-organized
and self-configured along with the lack of complete central
administration, standard methods such as Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI)-based schemes are inapplicable in estab-
lishing keys within WMNs.
Essentially, Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) seems to
be a more efficient approach for WMNs since it eliminates
the certificate based public key distribution indispensible in
the conventional PKI-based schemes. It basically avoids the
need for users to generate private keys and to distribute
them throughout the network, which reduces the computa-
tion necessary to join the network. Additionally, in IBC,
users only need to propagate their identities, which is typi-
cally included in the messages, instead of propagating both
the public keys and the signatures on them as it is done in
the traditional PKI-based schemes. This reduces the utilized
network bandwidth considerably. However, IBC assumes a
trusted third party (TTP) to generate and distribute the
private keys of the users, which does not fit with the charac-
teristics of WMNs. Additionally, using a TTP in a security
providing protocol is neither rational nor practical due to
the fact that such a system will be prone to single point
of failure. Therefore, it can be said that the limitations
of conventional solutions necessitate the development of a
brand-new security architecture to cope with the unique re-
quirements of WMNs [1].
1.1 Related Work
Zhang and Fang [21, 20] propose UPASS/ARSA scheme,
a secure authentication and billing architecture to enable an
omni-present network with faultness roaming. Their trust
model is built upon both PKI and IBC, which is not prac-
tical since they force the users to perform both protocols’
operations that require high computational power of differ-
ent types. Besides, ISA scheme proposed by Li [12] defines
a good key revocation method that provides an efficient net-
work access based on IBC with the assumption of the gate-
way router being the TTP.
Protocols mentioned above regarding secure key manage-
ment assume a trusted authority. In practice, it is not very
feasible to make such an assumption because of the hardness
of maintaining such a server safely and keeping it available
all the time. In order to eliminate that assumption, thresh-
old secret sharing is used in [22] and [8]. Zhou and Hass [22]
present a key management protocol based on the conven-
tional PKI-based schemes, in which a group of nodes share
the role of the Certification Authority (CA). As in (n, k)-
threshold schemes [15], any k partially signed certificates can
collaboratively construct a signed certificate which befits to
a CA signed certificate. A similar approach is proposed by
Kong [8], in which the RSA certificate signing key is dis-
tributed among all the nodes of the network. These two
schemes, [22] and [8], differ only in the name of the number
of shareholders, but in both, shares of the certificate signing
keys are generated and distributed by a TTP. Thus, they do
not provide a fully distributed key management.
On the other hand, Deng and Agrawal [7] propose a mech-
anism to secure the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) proto-
col for ad-hoc networks in which the trusted authority is
fully eliminated by the utilization of IBC along with thresh-
old secret sharing. Their problem is application specific and
so is their solution. Khalili et al. [10] and Deng et al. [5]
also use IBC with threshold secret sharing but to secure
the management of the keys for ad-hoc networks by offering
the nodes to generate the shares and the secret collabora-
tively, which is an application free solution. Both of those
mechanisms enable flexible and efficient key management for
ad-hoc networks and are fully distributed. The difference is
that [10] gives general information on the system with the
options to be selected for the public keys of the users and the
IBC to be utilized whereas [5] describes a specific solution
and evaluates it. However, those schemes cannot be applied
directly to WMNs as discussed in the subsection below.
1.2 Our Contributions
We propose a secure and efficient key establishment pro-
tocol by customizing the work in [5] for the sake of the sig-
nificatives of WMNs. In their scheme, all of the nodes come
together in a coalition so that they generate the requisite
shares, which has two important disadvantages in compari-
son with the characteristics of WMNs:
1. Large transmission delay : number of users that col-
laboratively compute the master private key directly
affects the amount of utilized network bandwidth. If
we assume that n users are in such a coalition, due
to the utilized secret sharing scheme described in Sec-
tion 2.2.2, at least n × (n − 1) packets needs to be
transmitted among the nodes.
2. Number of collaborative nodes dependent network re-
siliency : due to the fact that any k nodes can collabo-
ratively compute any other node’s private key, network
is tolerant to k− 1 compromised nodes, where k is the
threshold value. Thus, resiliency of the network can
only be increased by increasing the value of k, which
is infeasible since that value determines the required
number of the neighboring nodes by protocol defini-
tion.
WMNs’ characteristics provide us a way to centralize the
network to an extent by which we can ameliorate the above-
mentioned disadvantages. As discussed above, mesh routers
can be distinguished by the parameters they hold and by
the operations they perform. Thus, we imposed the bur-
den of the master key generation on them, which decreased
the number of nodes present in that phase. Besides, we
assumed that it is harder to compromise the mesh routers
than the mesh clients. With this assumption, we increased
the number of shares needed in the reconstruction process by
increasing the number of shares that the mesh routers hold.
As a consequence, resiliency of the system is increased with-
out increasing the number of required neighboring nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives necessary cryptographic background and Section 3 de-
scribes our proposed solution in detail. In Section 4, re-
siliency of our proposed solution is analyzed while in Sec-
tion 5 its simulative performance evaluation is discussed.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 6.
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In the following subsections Identity-based Cryptography
(IBC) and Secret Sharing schemes are explained in detail.
2.1 Identity-based Cryptography (IBC)
The concept of IBC is introduced by Adi Shamir [16] in
1985. The basic idea is that the public key of a user can be an
arbitrary string (i.e. IP address, e-mail address, name, etc.)
that uniquely identifies him in such a way that the denial
is impossible. Many schemes has been proposed regarding
IBC, which can be examined in detail from [4], [19], [11]
and [3], where [4] is based on quadratic residues while the
others use pairing operation defined over Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC)1. We preferred the IBC scheme proposed
by Boneh and Franklin [3] in which Weil Tate Pairing is
utilized as the bilinear mapping on ECC, as it has a perfor-
mance comparable to ElGamal encryption and the chosen
cipher text security in the random oracle model.
In ECC based IBC, master key, which is a public-private
key pair, is generated by a trusted authority, known as the
Private Key Generator (PKG). The public part of the key
is assumed to be known by every user while the private part
is kept secret in the PKG. When a user demands his private
key, PKG computes and delivers it to the requestor. After
delivering the private key, PKG does not involve in any other
operation. Thus, the network does not need to be centralized
and the solution is applicable for closed groups of users [16].
IBC consists of four phases:
1. Setup: Global parameters and the master key of the
system are generated by the PKG. In our construc-
tions, we used finite field Fq, where q is a sufficiently
large prime. The master private key, MKpriv, is ran-
domly selected and the master public key is computed
as MKpub = MKpriv × P , where P is the generator
of elliptic curve group.
2. Extract : PKG uses the master private key and the pub-
lic key of the requestor to construct the user’s private
key. Assuming that the user’s public key is QID, i =
H1(IDi), where H1 is a hash function, its private key
is then computed as PKi =MK
priv ×QID, i.
3. Encryption: Plaintext is encrypted using receiver’s pub-
lic key, QID, receiver .
4. Decryption: Ciphertext is decrypted using receiver’s
private key, PKreceiver.
One of the most important features of IBC is that the
sending party does not need to have its private key to be
able to send a message since it does not need for receiving
party’s certificate. Likewise, the receiving party does not
need to have its private key to be able to receive a message.
Besides, exchanged messages remain secret as long as an
adversary does not have either of the master private key
or the user private keys. Additionally, obtaining a number
of users’ private keys does not help to break another user’s
private key; thus the security of the system is ensured.
1In ECC, the difficulty is based on the difficulty of ellip-
tic curve discrete logarithm problem and it has almost the
same cryptographic security as 1024-bit key length used in
RSA [18].
2.2 Secret Sharing
Secret Sharing is a method that allows a secret to be dis-
tributed among a group of users, in such a way that no
single user can deduce the secret from his share alone. The
secret cannot be reconstructed unless a certain condition is
met, and that condition is generally a coalition of a sufficient
number of shareholders. All the secret sharing schemes uses
a field structure, for which we use Fq, where q is a prime.
2.2.1 Additive Secret Sharing (AdSS)
In AdSS schemes, reconstruction is performed by adding
up all the shares, thus, it is impossible to reconstruct the se-
cret unless all the shareholders collaborate. AdSS assumes
the existence of a TTP by whom the shares are generated
and transmitted securely2 to the corresponding sharehold-
ers. What TPP performs is to choose a large prime q, a
secret s ∈ Fq and n− 1 random numbers s1, s2, . . ., sn−1 to
be the shares of the secret. Then he computes the last share
of the secret by Equation 1 and sends the shares si to the
corresponding shareholders. The reconstruction of the se-
cret is then performed as all the shareholders come together
in a coalition and evaluate Equation 2.
sn = s−
n−1∑
k=1
sk (mod q) (1)
s =
n∑
i=1
si (mod q) (2)
2.2.2 Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS)
In ThSS schemes, reconstruction is performed by any sub-
set of k users, but no subset of smaller size. These schemes
are also known as (n, k)-ThSS schemes. They are secure
against active adversaries for k < n/2 and against passive
adversaries for k < n.
Shamir’s ThSS.
One of the widely used ThSS schemes is proposed by Adi
Shamir [15] in 1979, which is based on the Lagrange Interpo-
lation Polynomial3. The existence of a TTP is also assumed
in Shamir’s ThSS scheme, whose role is to generate and dis-
tribute the shares. TTP first chooses a large prime q, a
secret s ∈ Fq and a polynomial f(z) of degree k − 1, such
that f(0) = s. Then he evaluates the polynomial for each
user to generate their shares, si, via Equation 3 and sends
them to the corresponding shareholders. As for the recon-
struction of the secret, k of the shareholders combine their
shares performing the calculations in Equations 4 and 5.
si = f(i) (mod q) (3)
s =
k∑
j=1
sjlj(0) (mod q) (4)
2The trusted authority is assumed to be powerful enough to
establish a secure pairwise communication link with every
shareholder.
3It is a linear polynomial interpolation, in which given a set
of k data points in the 2-dimensional plane (xi, yi), there is
one and only one polynomial f(x) of degree k− 1 such that
f(x) = yi for all i for distinct values of xi’s [15].
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lj(0) =
k∏
i=1, i=j
i
j − i (mod q) (5)
Shamir’s ThSS without a Trusted Authority.
The problem of Shamir’s ThSS stems from the assumption
of a TTP, which can be eliminated by the idea of the nodes
being collaboratively computing the secret s. Each node
contributing to the generation of the secret has an equal in-
fluence on its value. For the collaborative key generation,
each node Ni selects a secret xi and a polynomial fi(z) of
degree k − 1, such that fi(0) = xi, generates the shares
xi, j of xi as in Equation 3 and sends them to the corre-
sponding node Nj , wherej = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n. When node
Ni receives n− 1 of xj, i’s, it can compute its shared secret
via Equation 6. The computed share is equivalent to the
share distributed by the TTP in a (n, k)-ThSS. Therefore,
with the collaboration of k shareholders, the secret can be
reconstructed as it is done in the (n, k)-ThSS scheme.
si =
n∑
j=1
xj, i (mod q) (6)
Variations on ThSS.
The abovementioned ThSS schemes consider splitting the
secret s among n users by giving each of them one share.
However, we might have different levels of trust for different
users or we might want to make some of the users more
important than the others. In such a situation, one way
of handling this is to give a larger number of shares to the
users we trust more: if we give x shares to the trusted users,
then we give y shares to the others, where x > y. Thus, the
scheme becomes a (ax+by, k)-ThSS, where a is the number
of users that we trust more and b is the number of regular
users. Another approach is to share the secret additively
among two groups whereby the additive shares are shared
again with a ThSS scheme within each group. To be more
precise, let us assume that we have n = n1+n2 users for the
share to be distributed. Let the secret be s = s1 + s2 with
s1 being shared in a (n1, k1)-ThSS fashion among the first
group and s2 being shared in a (n2, k2)-ThSS fashion among
the second group. Then, k1 users from the first group and
k2 users from the second group need to collaborate in order
to reconstruct the secret s.
3. PROPOSED METHOD: DISTRIBUTED
KEY ESTABLISHMENT (DKE)
Our approach is composed of three phases: master pri-
vate key share generation, master private key share distri-
bution and user private key generation. First phase consists
of collaborative generation of the master private key shares
performed by the mesh routers. In the second phase, gener-
ated master private key shares are distributed to the mesh
clients. As soon as a mesh client receives its master pri-
vate key share, it can also contribute to this process. Last
phase provides a private key generation service, by which
each mesh node can obtain its private key. This service is
carried out by a collaboration of a defined number of mesh
nodes, determined by the threshold value.
Table 1: Symbols used in Protocol Definition
Number of mesh nodes n
Number of mesh routers m
Number of mesh clients l
Number of shares for mesh routers x
Threshold value k
A mesh node MN
A mesh router MR
A mesh client MC
Secret s
Subshare of a secret ss
Master public key MKpub
Master public key share MKSpub
Master private key MKpriv
Master private key share MKSpriv
Master private key partial share MKPS
User public key Q
User private key PK
User private key share PKS
In the following subsections, we give detailed information
on the phases just after defining our assumptions. Symbols
used in the protocol definition can be found in Table 1.
3.1 Assumptions
Mesh nodes, especially the mesh routers, do not collude
to reveal any other mesh node’s private key. Our security
solution does not rely on the existence of a trusted au-
thority and there is no pre-defined mutual trust among the
mesh nodes. All the keys are generated collaboratively by
the mesh routers and distributed accordingly to the mesh
clients. What we assume here is that the mesh nodes will
not misbehave on their own or conspire with either of the
parties unless they are captured. Thus, we measure the re-
siliency of the network only against the adversaries.
It is harder to compromise the mesh routers and they
are arranged in a specific way to cover the network area.
Mesh routers are the mesh nodes that form the backbone of
WMNs; we know that they are there, for sure. Moreover,
the mesh routers are deployed in such a way that they cover
the network area in order to maintain continous connectiv-
ity. Thus, there should be a design in the placements of the
mesh routers. At this point, we assume that the physical
locations of the mesh routers are selected in such a way that
physical capture of these nodes becomes hard. For example,
the mesh routers can be placed at the top of street lamps or
at the roofs of properties where the physical capture requires
an effort equals to break-in.
Identities of the mesh nodes are unique and each node has
a mechanism to discover its one-hop neighbors. As in all
IBC schemes, there is the assumption of the identity of the
node being unique, since they are used as the public keys of
the users. In order to easily overcome this uniqueness issue,
the identities of the nodes are selected to be their addresses.
This can be simply obtained through dynamic address al-
location such as DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Pro-
tocol) where a centralized server ensures uniqueness of the
addresses.
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Communication among the mesh nodes is limited to neigh-
bourhood. An adversary can simply decrease the bandwidth
share by increasing the number of hops in a route between
the source and destination nodes that a packet will tra-
verse [2, 9]. In order to prevent this type of action, thus
to improve the capacity of the network, a node should only
communicate with nearby nodes as the analytical upper and
lower bounds of a network capacity implies [6]. This is ac-
compolished by broadcasting except for the first phase of
our protocol.
3.2 Master Private Key Share Generation
In this phase, master private key, MKpriv, is collabora-
tively computed by all of the mesh routers. Thus, the to-
tal number of shares present in the system depends on the
number of shares that the mesh routers hold, x, and the
number of mesh routers, m, yielding a total of m× x shares
to be distributed among the nodes of the network. In our
scheme, AdSS is also applied along with (m×x, k)-ThSS: the
master private key of the network is defined as MKpriv =
MKpriv, 1 + MKpriv, 2, where MKpriv, 1 is known by all
the mesh routers while MKpriv, 2 is shared among the mesh
nodes in a (m× x, k)-ThSS fashion.
Setup phase of ECC based IBC without master key gen-
eration process and the decision of the threshold value is
performed before any other operation. It can either be hard-
coded to the mesh nodes or a negotiation protocol might be
used in between the mesh routers to decide on the param-
eters that will be used. Here, we preferred the first option
for simplicity. Just after the process of realizing the param-
eters, the very first thing that the mesh routers perform is
the computation of the network’s master key. For master
private key share generation, each mesh router MRi com-
putes subshares ssi, j, a, as described in Section 2.2.2 and
sends them to the corresponding mesh router MRj , where
j = 1, 2, . . . , m and a = 1, 2, 3, . . . , x. As a mesh router
MRi receives (m− 1)× x subshares, it computes its master
private key share via Equation 7, where li(0) is the Lagrange
coefficient computed via the Equation 5. Additionally, with-
holding its master private key share, eachMRi computes its
master public key share via Equation 8 and publishes it.
MKSprivi =
x∑
a=1
(
m∑
j=1
ssj, i, a (mod q))× li(0) (7)
MKSpubi =MKS
priv
i × P (8)
In order for a mesh router to compute the actual value of
the master public key, it needs to hold (m − 1) × x master
public key shares and the reconstruction is performed via
Equation 9. This equation corresponds to reconstructing
the additively shared master public key whose one of the
additive parts is shared among the mesh nodes in a threshold
manner. Thus, first we combine the shares coming from k
mesh routers MRj and then we combine this result with the
share of its own.
MKpub = (
k∑
i=1
MKSprivi ×li(0)×P )+(MKpriv, 1j ×P ) (9)
3.3 Master Private Key Distribution
For every mesh node, second phase starts as soon as a
mesh client recognizes that one of its neighboring mesh nodes
finished computing its master key share. When a mesh client
receives a broadcast message consisting of the master public
key share, it generates a request message for the distribution
of the master private key share. Upon receiving that request,
the neighbouring mesh node MNj computes the master pri-
vate key partial share of the requesting mesh client MCi via
Equation 10 , where lj(i) is the Lagrange coefficient com-
puted via the Equation 5, and sends it to MCi. As the re-
questing mesh client MCi receives sufficient number of such
shares, it computes its master private key share by simply
adding up all the received partial shares as in Equation 11.
Additionally, MCi reconstructs its master public key share
as in Equation 8 using the information gathered from the
broadcast messages of the previous step.
MKPSj, i =MKS
priv
j × lj(i) (10)
MKSprivi =
k∑
j=1
MKPSj, i (mod q) (11)
3.4 User Private Key Generation
After a mesh node finishes computing its master private
key share, it can make use of the private key generation ser-
vice. For a mesh node MNi to reconstruct its private key,
it broadcasts a private key generation service request mes-
sage. Upon receiving such a request, a neighbouring mesh
node MNj computes the user private key share for MNi
via Equation 12, where Qj is the public key of the request-
ing node. Once the requesting node MNi receives sufficient
number shares, it can reconstruct its private key as in Equa-
tion 13. This equation corresponds to reconstructing the
additively shared user private key whose one of the additive
parts is shared among the mesh nodes in a threshold man-
ner. Thus, first we combine the shares coming from k mesh
nodes MNj and then we combine this result with the share
coming from a mesh router.
PKSj, i =MKSi ×Qj (12)
PKi = (
k∑
j=1
PKSj, i × lj(0) ) +MKpriv, 1p ×Qj (13)
3.5 Timeout Method
The most outstanding characteristic of the reconstruction
operations is that if a mesh node does not have sufficient
number of neighboring nodes, it simply can compute nei-
ther the master key shares nor its private key. However, a
situation as the following may also occur: a packet sent by a
mesh node consisting of a service request drops due to colli-
sions. As a result, that mesh node cannot compute either of
the keys in spite of having sufficient number of neighboring
nodes.
In order to overcome such a problem, a timeout method is
adopted. In this method, after sending a service request for
either master key share or user private key computations, a
mesh node sets a timer in correspondance with that request.
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For the master private key share computation performed by
the mesh routers, each mesh router should receive m − 1
subshares to compute the master private key share of their
own, where m is the number of mesh routers. Therefore, a
mesh router keeps sending request packets periodically until
it receives all the desired data. As for either master private
key share reconstruction performed by the mesh clients or
master public key share and user private key computations
performed by the mesh nodes, a mesh node needs k corre-
sponding shares. However, a mesh node might not has that
many neighbours. Thus, when there is a doubt on the recep-
tion of the demanded data, mesh nodes repeat their requests
periodically only a number of times.
4. RESILIENCY ANALYSIS
The resiliency of a network is the maximum number of
compromised nodes by which the security of the network is
not affected. If an adversary compromises a number of mesh
nodes holding a sufficient number of shares of the master
private key, then he can compute all the user private keys.
Thus, the resiliency of the network can be increased by in-
creasing the threshold value.
As described in Section 3.2, our scheme ensures that a
mesh router must always contribute to any of the recon-
struction processes. Therefore, in order for an adversary to
be successful, capturing a mesh router is a must. In other
words, as long as a mesh router is not compromised, no
matter how many mesh clients are captured, the resiliency
of the network is conserved. On the other hand, if a mesh
router is compromised, then the network is still resilient to
some extent as discussed below. Suppose we use (m×x, k)-
ThSS scheme, where m is the number of mesh routers each
of which has x shares of the master private key. In such
a scenario, an adversary must capture a number of nodes
wihholding a total of at least k shares of the master private
key in order to reconstruct the master private key of the
network. As a consequence, the resiliency of the network is
conserved even if an adversary compromises q mesh routers
and p mesh clients satisfying k < (q × x) + p.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We simulatively analyze the performance of our proposed
scheme. In this section, we first give simulation environment
and performance metrics and then, we discuss the results
obtained.
5.1 Simulation Environment and Performance
Metrics
We used Network Simulator 2 (ns2) [14] version 2.33 to
evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme. For the
simulation scenario, we modeled the network as having n =
30, 40, 50, . . . , 100 nodes within an area of 2000 × 2000
square meters. We simulated the performance of the net-
work for the threshold values k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12. As we
make the assumption that the mesh routers cover the net-
work area, we have 25 mesh routers. Each mesh router has
2 shares of the master private key and they are deployed in
grid manner as to cover the network area. In this deploy-
ment model, each mesh router is in the transmission range
of its neighboring mesh routers. On the other hand, mesh
clients are deployed within the area using bivariate uniform
random distribution.
All the simulations are run on a personal computer with
the following configuration: Windows Vista (32-bit), Intel
Core 2 Duo T5450 Processor at 1.66 GHz, 2 GB RAM and
GCC 4.3.3 on Cygwin 1.5.25-15. Morever,for the configu-
ration of ns2, we used MAC and network interface types of
802.11p [13], omni-directional antenna with a transmission
range of 375 meters, priority queue defined under drop tail
queue, Dynamic Source Routing and Transmission Control
Protocol.
We consider two metrics in our performance model:
1. Latency of Key Establishment is defined as the time
elapsed between the initial deployment and the end of
key establishment processes of all nodes.
2. Success Percentage for Private Key Generation is the
ratio of the number of mesh nodes that can compute
their user private keys over the total number of the
mesh nodes present within the network.
5.2 Simulation Results
As mentioned in Section 3.5, private key generation ser-
vice is carried out succesfully if and only if the request-
ing mesh node receives sufficient number of shares from
its neighboring nodes that finished computing their mas-
ter private key shares. Thus, the success percentage not
only depends on the number of shares received but also to
the number of neighboring nodes that actually have their
master private key shares. Figure 2 shows the change in
success percentage of private key generation with respect
to the threshold value for different network sizes. When the
threshold value is 4, all the nodes compute their user private
keys while when it is 6, at least 90% of them can perform
that computation. As we increase the threshold value, the
success ratio decreases; meaning that some nodes cannot
compute their user private keys due to insufficient amount
of received shares. On the other hand, as we increase net-
work size, for the same threshold value, we achieve a higher
success ratio. This is because of the fact that more shares
become accessible by the requesting node as the number of
neighboring nodes increase.
In Figure 3, change in latency is examined with respect
to the threshold value for different network sizes. Since the
most of the burden is in the first phase, i.e. mesh routers
generate the master private key shares, latency of key es-
tablishment has not been affected by the total number of
mesh nodes. Also, the threshold values smaller than 6 do
not affect the latency. This is due to the fact that almost
all the mesh nodes can compute their private keys for those
threshold values. However, as we increase threshold value,
some of the nodes cannot compute their private keys and
they use the timeout method described in Section 3.5. This,
consequently, causes an increase in latency.
6. CONCLUSIONS
WMNs are an emerging research area representing a good
solution for providing low-cost and high-speed network ser-
vices for the end users. In this paper, we propose a secure
and efficient key establishment protocol for WMNs. Our
scheme is based on IBC by which the communication within
the network is secured. Moreover, we make use of a vari-
ant of Shamir’s (n, k)-ThSS scheme along with AdSS, where
trusted authority is abrogated with the collaborative gener-
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Figure 2: Success percentage of the proposed DKE scheme with respect to the threshold value for different
numbers of nodes
Figure 3: Latency of the proposed DKE scheme with respect to the threshold value for different numbers of
nodes
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ation of the secrets, yielding the improved resiliency against
attacks.
Our simulations show that 100% of the mesh nodes can
compute their private keys within at most 60 seconds, re-
gardless of the number of mesh nodes, for the threshold
value 4. For the threshold values 4 < k ≤ 8 and for the
number of mesh nodes 40 ≤ n ≤ 100, at least 90% of the
mesh nodes can compute their private keys within at most
70 seconds. For the worst case, i.e. a network with 40 nodes
performing at threshold level 12, at least 58% of the mesh
nodes can compute their private keys within 90 seconds on
the average. On the other hand, at threshold value 8, an
increase in the number of mesh nodes from 40 to 100 results
in a 25% increase in the rate of successful private key gener-
ations. These results clearly show the tradeoff between the
resiliency of the network and the efficiency of our scheme: an
increase in either the threshold value or the number of mesh
nodes results in an increase in resiliency while decreasing the
efficieny.
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